| the "traditional social structure of the Ottoman Empire" as amply portrayed and emphasized by Dr. Stirling. Differences of identification and cross-identification with family, tribe, village community, urban center, sect, class, and racial extraction have been in operation in this part of the world since the dawn of human history. They are still strong forces to be reckoned with, as each national unit in the region strives to achieve integrated and stable societal organization. Yet we would be cherishing a distorted and misleading picture of the situation, should we fail to see the underlying forces of unity and cohesion. These, in my view, were mainly responsible for the continuance of a working social order over the centuries and for the persistence of cultural identity against tremendous forces of change. These unifying forces are likely to emerge stronger and more dominant in the future, as Middle East society adjusts to new forms or structures. I am talking about tribal organization, which has been a continuous source of contribution to the way of life anywhere in the region; the farming village community with its basic institutions, firmly established and similarly organized, whether in North Africa, Lebanon, or Iraq; certain basic values, customs, and mores shared in common by most of these peoples; and the dominant roles of the Arabic language and the religion of Islam. Thus when the Ottoman Empire came to an end, these unifying forces asserted themselves, and the prevailing social order did not shatter into scores of fragments; it broke into only two major entities, the new Turkey and the emergent Arab world. The subsequent division of the latter into mandates, protectorates, and semi- independent units was only power-politics deep. It could not penetrate to the unifying societal core, the underlying cohesive web of life. Another feature, which Dr. Stirling implied or mentioned briefly in his discussion, should be specially emphasized. This is the traditional cleavage between the two major segments of Middle Eastern society, the wide gap that separates the elite minority at the top from the large masses at the bottom. The social, economic, and political distances between the two are great, and the means of communication meager. Yet the two belong organically to the same social system and are integrated within the total cultural pattern. From this reality arises a peculiar conditioning of the process of change and national development. At the same time it poses a stubborn dilemma for the elite—how to accelerate the desired change for development as they see it, whereas the social center of gravity lies among the people, who lag behind on the other side of the gap Indications from various fields of experience have become increasingly convincing that here is the key feature of Middle Eastern society, through which past developments can best be understood and future trends predicted. This is not only |
| significant as a method of approach for students of Middle Eastern culture; it is also of paramount importance for leaders planning and implementing various technical developments in the region. Let me touch briefly upon a few supporting illustrations. The "model village" approach to the improvement of living conditions among the peasants, as practised in some of these countries, may be well designed and sound, but only so far as the elite designers are concerned. Upon actual implementation among the rural people, numerous problems arise because of peculiar social and economic conditions. The result is often unbalanced change and frustrating disorganisation. The agricultural co-operative has proved its worth in many countries (including some in the Middle East) over the past fifty years, as a dynamic agency of progressive change and sound development for the farming village community. But when the elite become impatient, and go so far as to make the co-operative a legal obligation, both the method and the objective of the desired change are unavoidably distorted. Mechanized farming, now widely sought in the Middle East, serves as another good illustration of the principle we are trying to affirm. It is dynamic and can bring about quick changes in farming and rewarding results, but only when applied at the hands of farmers who are ready for it, under appropriate social, economic, and technical conditions. In many cases the leaders of development in the Middle East have gone ahead with large-scale programs of mechanization without due consideration for these conditions. As a result, the economic returns have not been as rewarding as expected; also undesirable changes in the social and economic organization of rural life have arisen. We could go on citing many other similar cases from actual experience, but space does not permit. The evidence is convincing, however, that the process of change and development in the Middle East is strongly conditioned by the dominant gap in the social structure; that the elite leadership on the one side and the large majority of the people on the other conceive of change from different assumptions and proceed with it at vastly different rates; that this imbalance in the process is mainly responsible for the various manifestations of disorganization and instability in the region; and that the main answer to the problem lies in a determined effort by the elite to bridge the gap and achieve a more integrated social system that can move ahead progressively as a whole. To leave the matter at this point would amount to giving a totally negative impression of the situation. We cannot do so, for there is a promising positive aspect, although it is not yet dominant. In each one of the Middle Eastern countries, enlightened elements among the elite have become thoroughly aware of this fundamental |
| problem and have taken some firm steps in the direction of bridging the gap. Among these steps we may enumerate the following: the Rural Social Centers in Egypt, aimed at the uplift of the village community from within, at the level of the people; the several community development and extension programs now in operation in several countries, in co-operation with United States and United Nations technical assistance agencies; the truly co-operative society of Abadiyeh village in Lebanon, developed entirely by local leadership and initiative; the planned resettlement of rural families and communities in the irrigation scheme of the Ghab in northern Syria, in contrast with the absentee mechanized cotton development of the Jezirah in that country, as discussed by Dr. Stirling; the Dujailah and other land- distribution and resettlement projects of Iraq; the national agrarian reform programs of Turkey and Egypt and by the Shall of Iran on the royal domain; the recent emphasis upon fundamental education under the leadership of UNESCO and the determined trend toward universal elementary schooling. Dr. Stirling has discussed at length the leading roles played by modern technology and improved methods of administration in the changing Middle Eastern society. I wish to elaborate briefly with two observations. The first is that the process of technical change, so far, has taken place mainly on the basis of borrowing from the outside and imposition from above. It has been, so to speak, set free to take its course, without much consideration for its far-reaching implications and repercussions in the living patterns of the people and the social structure. Concern has been primarily for the immediate result wanted from the borrowed item of technology. Beyond that, the chips have been left to fall as they would and society to adjust belatedly the best it could. Thus, for example, the modern industrial plant was set up but there were no plans for the arising labor needs or anticipation of labor problems. The tractor, the irrigation pump, and the automobile substantially increased production and income for the tribal chief, but they helped turn him into an absentee landlord and his kinsmen into landless sharecroppers. Piped water assured an adequate and readily available supply for the village folk, but it did away with the traditional social institution that had developed over the centuries around the village well. Through efficient techniques of communication and transportation, central authorities were better able to prevent raiding, keep peace among the tribes, and push for their settlement, but no provisions were made for adequate substitutes to avoid physical and moral deterioration. The modern system of higher education was set up successfully, but it drew away promising youth from the local communities, thus accentuating the gap in the social structure. One may argue that all of this, and more, is part of the price any society must pay for |
| its gain from technical advancement. This is true, but only to a certain degree. The difference is great indeed, in the magnitude of arising problems and the degree of disorganisation, between a society adjusting to technical change from within its own pattern of culture, and another, like the Middle East, borrowing intensively from abroad. In the former case, it is a matter of healthy, balanced growth, with possible minor crises; whereas in the latter it is intensive, one-sided change, by forces alien to the native culture, beyond the capacity of society to absorb the shock and adjust effectively. I wish, however, to go one step further and assert that it is not inevitable that the process of technical change in the Middle East should always demand such a high price in disorganization, frustration, and upheaval. Borrowing from culture to culture can take place selectively. Adoption of modern technology can be planned to fit the economy and other aspects of the receiving culture. Social science has advanced sufficiently to enable us to detect tensions arising from new techniques and provide for adequate solutions. The successful adoption of this course, however, rests upon the assumption that there is a thorough understanding of, and respect for, the culture, the way of life of the people. I am talking about the people of the Middle East as they actually live today in their villages, tribal communities, and urban centers. My observation on public administration in the Middle East is that it has lagged glaringly behind technical change, to the detriment of both and of society as a whole. This is another manifestation of the preoccupation with the tangible material aspects of development and the relative disregard of the human aspect. The underlying erroneous assumption is that technology is sufficient unto itself, that once it is borrowed and established, human relations will take care of themselves and the social system will adjust to the new situation automatically. The process of change does not function this way; stable social organization rests upon the thorough integration of technical change with institutional change. A few examples will show how this lag in public administration manifests itself. The forms of civil service established in the area are similar to their counterparts in Western countries, from which most of them have been copied. Yet they are vastly different in content and application. There are standards for the selection of civil servants, but actual appointment of personnel to the job submits, to one degree or another, to the practice of nepotism. Full-time service is required from the official, but in many cases he is underpaid and must seek an additional job to meet his needs. The usual hierarchy of personnel is well established, and the pyramid of job classification defines and distributes functions adequately. In practice, however, there is so much centralization of authority that initiative is stifled and efficiency reduced materially. The adopted technology creates new situations in human relations and calls for new forms of organization. These require specially trained and |