A MULTIVARIATE MODEL OF SOCIAL ORDER
The Propositions
The following propositions are all stated with reference to the positive value of the first term of relationship. It may be assumed that the converse statements are also all proposed. Sub-propositions note conditions affecting the linear continuity of the relationships. These are of two primary kinds: one is where a given quantity of (a) affects (b) out of proportion to the effects of other quantities of (a) on (b). Thus a little knowledge may be dangerous while a lot is useful. The other sub-proposition type denotes conditions where (a) affects (b) in greater proportion to the extent that (a) is affected by (c) rather than by other causes. Thus its good to feel secure, but not if you do it through inordinate repression.
1. The more homogenous is a population, the more will its members have multiplex bonds. (102)
2. The more homogenous is a population, the more similar will be its members' definitions of social situations. (1-7)
3. The more homogenous is a population, the more will it have an inclusive group structure. (1-4)
A. Homogeneity stemming from centralization of power will not be characterized by inclusivity, though it may be productive of it over time.
4. The more homogenous is a population, the more will its members assume an adequacy of information in their decision-making and analysis. (1-6)
5. The more multiplex are the bonds among a population, the more will it contain solidary social groups. (2-3)
6. The more multiplex are the bonds among a population, the more will it be characterized by long-term planning. (2-5)
7. The more multiplex are the bonds among a population, the more similar will be its members definitions of social situations. (2-7)
8. The more multiplex are the bonds among a population, the more will its members assume an adequacy of information. (2-6)
9. The more solidary are the social groups in a population, the more will bonds among the population be multiplex. (3-2)
10. The more solidary are the social groups in a population, the less centralized will be the distribution of social power.
A. At the very lowest ranges of centralization group solidarity will produce an increase on any measure.
11. The more solidary are the social groups in a population, the greater will be the force of authority. (3-11)
12. The more solidary are the social groups in a population, the more stable will be the social relationships of its members. (3-10)
13. The greater the inclusivity of group structure in a population, the more will its social groups be solidary. (4-3)
14. The greater the inclusivity of group structure in a population, the more will its members assume an adequacy of information. (4-6)
15. The greater the inclusivity of group structure in a population, the more similar will be its members' definitions of social situations. (4-7)
16. The greater the inclusivity of group structure in a population, the more will its members social relationships be stable. (4-10)
17. The greater the inclusivity of group structure in a population, the less centralized will be the distribution of social power. (4-8)
18. The greater the inclusivity of group structure in a population, the more will bonds among the population be multiplex. (4-2)
19. The greater the inclusivity of group structure in a population, the greater will be the force of authority. (4-11)
20. The longer the term of planning among a population, the more will it contain solidary social groups. (5-3)
21. The longer the term of planning among a population, the greater will be the stability of its members' social relationships. (5-10)
22. The longer the term of planning among a population, the greater will be the similarity of its members definitions of social situations. (5-7)
23. The longer the term of planning among a population, the more accessible will be its members' ends. (5-9)
A. The effect of planning term is greatest where accessibility is least.
24. The greater the assumed adequacy of information, the longer will be the term of planning among a population. (6-5)
25. The greater the assumed adequacy of information among a population, the more accessible will be its members ends. (6-9)
26. The greater the similarity of definitions of social situations among a population, the more solidary will be its group structure. (7-3)
27. The greater the similarity of definitions of social situations among a population, the greater will be the stability of its members' relationships. (7-10)
28. The greater similarity of definitions of social situations among a population, the longer will be its term of planning. (7-5)
29. The greater the similarity of definitions of social situations among a population, the more accessible will be its members ends. (7-9)
30. The greater the centralization of power in a population, the less will it be characterized by solidarity of social groups. (8-3)
31. The greater the centralization of power, the more will a population be homogenous. (8-1)
32. The greater the centralization of power in a population, the less will its members have stable social relationships. (8-10)
33. The greater the centralization of power in a population, the less inclusive will be its group structure. (8-4)
34. The greater the centralization of power in a population, the less accessible will be its members ends. (8-9)
A. Initial, short-term centralization will increase the accessibility of short-term ends.
35. The greater the stability of members' relationships, the more multiplex will be the social bonds among a population. (10-2)
36. The greater the stability of members' relationships, the longer will be the term of planning among a population. (10-5)
37. The greater the stability of members' relationships among a population, the more will its members assume an adequacy of information. (10-6)
38. The greater the stability of members' relationships, the more similarity in definitions of social situations will there be among population. (10-7)
39. The greater the stability of members' relationships, the greater will be the force of authority among a population. (10-11)
40. The greater the stability of members' relationships, the more accessible will be the ends of population members. (10-9)
A. The proportionate influence of stability on accessibility of ends increases with extent to stability.
41. The greater the force of authority, the less centralization of power will there be in a population. (11-8)
42. The greater the force of authority among a population, the more stable will be its members social relationships. (11-10)
43. The greater the force of authority among a population, the more will its members assume adequacy of information. (11-6)
44. The greater the force of authority among a population, the more similar will be its members' definitions of social situations. (11-7)
45. The greater the force of authority, the more accessible will be members' ends among a population. (11-9)
46. The greater the force of authority, the longer will be the term of planning among a population. (11-5)
47. The more accessible are the ends of members, the greater will be the assumed adequacy of information among a population. (9-6)
48. The more accessible are members' ends, the greater will be the stability of social relationships among a population. (9-10)
49. The more accessible are members ends, the less centralization of power will there be in a population. (9-8)
Two things should be borne in mind with regard to these propositions. First, they are inexact, and there are exceptions. Second, they refer to populations of the size, duration and interaction density (of not the clear demarcations) which we characteristically term 'societies'. They do not apply with any similar regularity or rigour to small groups, for example. The inexactness, I think, is largely a function of interactions among the variables. Each of the statements made is of a casual but partial relationship, not of a strict determination or logical implication. Thus, in 'real life', the effects of a multiplicity of variables may and frequently will negate the effect of an isolated opposite tendency. Ideally quantitative measurements could eventually bring this under their purview. There is cause for scepticism with our hope, however, since in social life the fact of actors' continual decisions and actions means that proportionate inputs do not always have proportionate effects. This is obviously true of individual decisions, where we can no more be two places at once if both are desirable than if only one is. Both mechanisms of collective decision-making and the latent 'decisions' produced by the unintended consequences of purposive action translate this to social levels. Probabilities are thus not always demonstrable in population proportions. Thus a 70% probability (or 70% plebiscite) that a nation will go to war does not allow for only 70% of the nation to go to war. In other words, a partial population may make decisions equally binding on the whole. Similarly, those Tallensi who participate in a market economy for personal reasons are participating in an (at least partially) unintentional collective 'decision' to reduce the homogeneity and relational stability of their population. Though solidary social groups or multiplex social relations might make the decision to become a migrant labourer difficult or painful to some of the large percentage who do so, it would be impossible to resurrect any measure of influence of this constraint of the social change process.
Now let us look at certain paths of relationship among these variables. In other words, let us combine these propositions into a diagrammatic representation. Figure 5 gives the total set of relationships suggested in the propositions, without regard to direction of influence. Figure 6 gives the positive and figure 7 the negative relations. Although there are a great many more of the former, the latter are crucial as we shall see.
In particular, note the way in which variable 8, centralization/decentralization
of power, is a focus of potential negative relations. Negative relations in this
model are primary ways in which contradictions appear in the social order. Such contradictions
are then neither compensated for by some social mechanism or act as inherent factors
of change. Either kind of reaction (i.e., closed or open series) works through second
order connections, so that for example, (8) has a positive influence on (1) which
has a positive influence on (4) which has a negative influence on (8). Centralization
of power thus increases homogeneity of population which in turn increases inclusivity
of groups structure, which in turn decreases centralization of power. While this
may be seen as a compensating mechanism, returning through a closed loop to counteract
the original change, this does not make its social operation clear. To understand
the latter, some temporal statement is necessary. The range of potential elapses
in any such loop is considerable. Here, the balancing effect would likely be only
one of waves in an overall historical span of changes and continuities.
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It should be remembered that we are dealing here with a model of social order, not of social organization in general. Other factors in social organization and without it may influence the extent of any of the variables in the model. Demography, ecology, and the broader aspects of culture are all important, but they are not intrinsic to social order as we have defined it. As any exploration of the path diagrams will show, social order can admit of internal contradictions, sources of acceleration and/or deceleration of changes. It is not merely result, but always a part of social causality as well.
The Variables - The Propositions
