This conversion of existing local factions into local sections of the national parties made possible the very rapid establishment of a two-party political system in full-scale activity. Outside urban intellectual circles, the R.P.P. was an alliance of all factions who happened to be on top in 1950, the D.P. an alliance of all the local oppositions. During the time of the election rioting or disturbances between the parties were reported in the press, as though these were due to the new political activity. In fact, it is highly probable that in almost all cases these were old local factions with new political affiliations for whom the election provided an excuse for active hostility.
This analysis implies that the D.P. in fact captured the support of most of the local oppositions which existed in every town and village in Turkey. Once this had happened third parties had relatively little chance of becoming established in rural areas on a national scale. Most communities have two main rival factions, even if these are loose confederations of smaller groups and somewhat unstable. If third forces exist in some communities they are neither numerous nor strong enough to enable a third party to weld them into a national force offering serious rivalry to the two main parties.
Of course, this analysis is not true for all people nor for all communities. Some people in every community would be uncommitted, and some vote in national elections differently from their explicit affiliation. Some communities possess internal structures permanently or temporarily unlike the simple two-faction model I have assumed. Moreover, if the system is to function in this way the people must feel a reasonable degree of confidence in each of the two parties and in freedom from persecution for political activity.
The system as I have outlined it strengthens the tendency towards a local spoils system. If people support a national party because they want the existing office holders in their local community out of office, then when that party wins they expect to replace them. The motive for remaining loyal to one party is not intellectual conviction, but the realisation that in order to reap political rewards, one must not only be on the winning side but have a reputation for being a trustworthy supporter So the parties, like the parties in the U.S.A., become alliances of local factions each contending in its own area; overall