Previous Page


  9


  (v).   Occupations

To produce such economic growth, and to run the
resulting economy, millions of people had to learn
hundreds of new skills and professions.  Turkey now
has huge armies of teachers, lawyers, doctors,
scientists, technicians, managers, accountants,
medical auxiliaries, transport workers, shopkeepers,
factory workers, industrialists small and large, and
of course, memur - civil servants of all kinds .
Detailed and reliable occupational statistics are not
easy to find.  One simple example: in 1942, Turkey
had just over 30,000 teachers of all kinds, in 1985,
330,000 [ Statistical Annual 1989].

(vi).   Urban growth  

The main manpower source was the villages.  To
supply all these positions, people had to leave their
villages and move to town, and accordingly the towns
have grown at a great speed for seven decades.  
In 1950, roughly 5 million people out of 21 million
did not live in villages.  By 1986, 26 of 50 million
did not live in villages.  Urban-rural migration is not
a puzzle; it is universally part and parcel of economic
and demographic growth.

(vii).   Knowledge and Social Cognition

Two kinds of obvious knowledge are necessary for
economic growth.  First, everyone needs some level
of more or less uniform basic education and training
[ Gellner 1983].  Second, everyone needs specific and
detailed knowledge about the job they are doing,
from office cleaners to directors of space
programmes.  How villagers get to learn these things
is itself complex enough.

But there is something more subtle, more
fundamental, which seems seldom discussed, let alone
effectively researched.  Humans seldom stop talking.



 


  10

  Villagers watch television, listen to politicians,
receive visits from their kin and friends who now do
things other than agriculture, hear from their
children about schools and universities and so on and
so on.  They talk about these things.  I call this `social
cognition'.  [Giddens 1976, Mardin 1989, Fischer
1991].  It seems very difficult to research, still more
difficult to measure.  But the difference between
Turkey 1950 and Turkey 1986 in social cognition,
that is, in what people know, take for granted, are
able to discuss and tell each other, is colossal; not just
in villages, but at all levels of society.

Labour migration is one  of the effects and one of the
causes of this huge difference.  People only go to
town if they have what they see as evidence that there
is something to go for.  Social networks carry
information through this constant conversation.
Moreover, as the total sum of potential information
grows, people consciously build networks of other
people who know how to find out the things which
they themselves do not expect to know.  This kind of
knowledge is obviously the basis of `chain'
migration.  Much more important, it is also the
source of innovation and enterprise, the way people
with resources to invest, learn about new
opportunities for production or commerce.  Village
failures provide experience for future village
successes.  Indeed, profitable information based on
experience becomes a major asset, even a commodity
to be exchanged with those who can offer some kind
of return.

(viii).  Organisation and Social Control

Here I make two related points.  First, organisation,
that is, the co-ordinated arrangements which people
make to get things done, is central to all daily
activities and to all achievements in all human
societies; and to human social evolution.  An
organised group of any size in any society - the State
itself is the largest and most complex, with
multinational companies and international



 


  11

  organisations close behind - is bound to run into all
kinds of problems.  These problems mainly centre
round the clash between the personal aims and
rivalries of individual members and subordinates,
and the aims of the organisation, and of its bosses.
To run a village, complex and subtle controls and
organisations are necessary.   But to run a modern
state and a modern economy with its dozens of
different kinds of organisation and its multiple
opportunities for private power and gain, both
legitimate and illegitimate, is infinitely  more
complex.  It seems to me that what makes the rich
and successful nations rich and successful is above
everything else, their capacity for effective
organisation; not because as individuals their citizens
are more competent, but simply because as societies
they have a store of social cognition about
organisation, and a culture in which effective
organisation has become embedded and legitimised.   

In the city, villagers from rural Turkey find
themselves controlled by, and having to learn about
and come to terms with, all kinds of organisations
that are new to them.  Many, by setting up
businesses, find themselves compelled to organise
others in ways which they had never thought about.
[Ayata 1982]  They organise themselves not only for
work and production but for urban living; for
finding themselves homes, for getting municipal
services, for exploiting bureaucracies, for all kinds
of purposes.  Some of these are illegal, some even
criminal; some may involve violence.  

So labour migration imposes problems not only of
organisation, but also of public order.  Order is
essential for any social life.  Social control involves
not only the formal and imposed controls of State
bureaucracies, the police, and the disciplines imposed
by working for employers, but also, and more
important, the informal controls of family, gossip
and neighbourhood.  The way social control works in
villages seems to me different from the way it works



 


  12

  in towns.  So massive rural urban labour migration
causes major changes in mechanisms of control, not
only within organisations, but also in ordinary day to
day living.  [Stirling 1957, 1984]

(ix).  Islam

Precisely what is currently happening, and even
more, what ought to happen, about Islam in Turkey
is hotly and passionately debated.  [Mardin 1989,
Tapper 1991, Toprak 1981] I make only four brief
points.  First, virtually everyone in Turkey now sees
Islam, not just as the religion of pious Turks, but as a
fundamental contrast both to western secularism, and
to Christian society.   Second, universal primary
education, now including religion, gives a huge new
literate market for religious texts and periodicals of
all kinds.  Third, the earnings of migrants have
financed not only mosques, but systematic religious
training for children on a wide scale; people,
especially the young, are very much better informed
than they were in 1950.  Fourth, moving about
brings migrants into contact with a wide range of all
kinds of people, including ardent Islamic proselytises
of various kinds, and especially with a supply of
religious texts, sound tapes, and videos.

(x).  Gender

Gender is perhaps the most objectively difficult and
the mostly emotionally fraught topic of current social
and cultural study.  I make only two points.  Ataturk
reformed the law and education, and succeeded in
modifying the conduct of educated Turkish women.
Many entered the professions, and the civil service.  [
Abadan-Unat 1981, Kandiyoti 1991] The changes in
the villages since 1950 are also marked, variable and
complicated, but very different from the changes
among the urban educated.  Most important, perhaps;
women and girls now travel, and almost all girls go
to school.  Their stock of knowledge, their social
cognition, is different and vastly greater.  They are
less segregated and less firmly subordinated than in



Next Page   Contents

Return to Papers index