Previous Page



  the village and ploughs, Mehmet (DS 2), goes to Ankara for the summer
months to sell vegetables.  The third example is the household of four brothers,
(FB 4).  One of the three brothers declares he will always farm, the eldest - -
Mustafa - -who has just returned from military service, is vague, the other tow
are plasterers. The youngest has been a year in Istanbul without sending letters
or  money, but they are all confident that he will return to them and bring
money.  They firmly express their intention of staying together in one
household.  Similarly in Al village, it is said to be common for brothers to
share a house, leaving one at home to farm while the rest to away as ustalar,
and I even found an example of this arrangement in Kz village which has
practically no migrant labour.

In four cases in Sakaltutan, households have divided, but still work the land in
common.  In one of these, the question of division is complicated by seven
daughters surviving to only on e son (BK 3), and delayed because he is at
present doing military service.  Another group of three brothers (KU 1, 2 and
3) have not divided the land, but though they all go away to do unskilled work
from time to time, they do not co-operate systematically.  Zubeyr (SI 4) still
holds his land in common with a rather dim brother (SI 5), who with this
equally dim but lusty son  does most of the agricultural work, while Zubeyr
works at his trade, or makes trading trips into the remoter villages.  I doubt
whether the advantage is in this case reciprocal.  Selahaddin and Sefer (BA 4
and 5) offer a good example of co-operation.  Their grandfathers were
brothers, and one of them has married the other’s sister.  Both are plasterers,
and they take it in turn to go to town, leaving that other to plough the land
which they share, and to look after the other’s wife and children.

Both Huseyn (BA 3) and Sayit (VT 2) have left their elder

  XIII.1                                                  205

  brothers, with the land undivided, but take a share of the crop.  In both cases
division would leave so little land that it would provide neither house with a
living.  Huseyn is a herdsman and unskilled labourer, Sayit works in the
factory in Kayseri.  Galip and Haci Ahmet (FB 2 and 3) have divided their
land, but Galip works it all and gives an exact share of the crops to his brother,
who is a porter in Kayseri.
The difference between theses separate households and those where brothers
remain together is considerable.  The senior brother in a joint household
exercises authority over the household, thought obviously he does not enjoy the
control of a father over sons, since the farmer brother and the earning brother
are mutually dependent, bot having resources which the other needs, and
serious disagreement leads simply to the delayed separation taking place.  In



 




  the only tow examples, among those quoted, of a stable joint household of this
type - Zubeyr’s (SI 4) and Mehmet’s (DS 2) households - the elder brother is
the stronger personality, and has definite control.  On the other hand, where
separation of the households takes place, but some degree of economic co-
operation is continued, each household is autonomous, under the control of a
single father, and husband.  Under these conditions, it is rather a case of co-
operation between equals.

The new habit of skilled migrant labour seems to effect the separation of
households in two opposite ways.  First, by giving the young and adequate
source of  income outside the control of their father, it frees them from
economic dependence on him and his land.  The acute hardship which results
from a young man leaving his father and remaining in the village is
exemplified by Mehmet (VA 11), who, instead of being a member of a
household with land and man power to spare for going to town, has become the
head of a small landless household in which he is sole breadwinner.  But when
the young men earn good money in town, as the three sons, (VA 7, 8 and 9), of
Mustafa (VA 5), or Mahmut (son of AG 1), they are not liable to this fear.
One father in Ac village told me that all six of his sons worked in the Kayseri
cotton mill, and earned a living wage.  Each had

  XIII.1                                                  206

  separated from him, quite amicably, shortly after marriage.  The last had just
married.  “In about six months he will separate too”, he said.  “What about
your old age?”.  “They all give me money”, he replied.  I find this case
surprising, if the information is even approximately correct.  I am sure that
separation on this scale would not happen in a family which was wholly, or
largely, agricultural in occupation.
On the other hand, where brothers have bought land to keep one man fully
occupied, but not enough to divide among, say, two or three households, there
is an obvious economic motive  to remain one h, so that, as I have descried
above, one brother can farm, and the others can earn cash in the town, at least
until they each have sons old enough to earn or plough for them.  Such an
arrangement depends on the economic resources being neither very small, nor
adequate for division, on the resulting joint household not being too large, and
on cordial personal relations not only between the brothers, but also between
their wives.

  2. Debt

  No question is more difficult to investigate than that of debt.  Not only is it



 



  impolite to enquire about such private matters, but also one can usually be
confident that the answer received, if one is sufficiently fortunate to receive an
answer, has been given for complex motives and has little to do with the true
state of affairs.  The difficulty of estimating indebtedness was increased by the
failure of the harvest in 1949, which increased poverty and made conditions
abnormal.  
  Three main types of debt may be distinguished.  Firstly, loans from the
  government controlled Agricultural Bank;  secondly, illegal commercial loans
at extortionate interest, and lastly personal loans between neighbours and
kinsfolk.  
  The Agricultural Bank(1) extends several types of credit to peasants, but
  the only one that need concern us here is by far


  XIII.2                                                  207

  the commonest - loans to meet current expenses.  These are loans, in theory up
to 800 T.L., given for one year from harvest loans, charging six percent per
annum, and secured jointly.  Any group of three or more from the same
village can raise such a loan on security of land, provided they have the
headman’s signature, and that of at least two members of the Council of Elders,
to certify their statements about their property.  No man who has a loan unpaid
can raise another, regardless of the size of the loan outstanding, in fact, he
cannot raise another loan unless all members of the debtor group have paid
their debts.  As in practice the group normally consists of all the debtors in one
village there is a strong social pressure on defaulters to pay up.  There is a way
round this difficulty, by which the bettor off can assist those unable to met
their debts.  Once the old debt is settled they can raise a new loan, so they only
need credit from some other source for a short period.  The demand for
guarantee by the headman puts a good deal of power in his hands.  He, like the
rest of the village, regards the bank as fair game,, and e is restricted by his
fellow villages, and the regulations governing repayment, rather than by any
sense of responsibility or  regard for truth.  The bank has special arrangements
for the failure of crops;  the situation is reported to Ankara, who then give
permission for a general moratorium on all bank debts for one extra year.  Of
course, this means that bank credit is not available to the villages when he
needs it most, since if the village as a whole cannot pay off its debts, no one in
it can raise new loans.  Just before the harvest this regulation was relaxed, and
loans were extended to those in the village who had no personal debts
outstanding.  One easy way of evading this limitation is to use the name of
another member of the household.  This loophole in the regulations is due to
their being based on the town concept of every adult individual as an
independent economic unit, whereas in the system for which they are framed



 




  this unit is the household, not the individual.  I was unable to see the records of
Bank loans to Sakaltutan;  my own information is confined to a few families
where I was trusted with such secrets.  Many

  XIII.2                                                  208

  households had debts which ranged from 50 T.L. to 250 T.L. (£5 -£31).  The
1950 crops were again below average, the village was visited by a bank official
to inspect the deficiency, and a further year’s moratorium was confidently
expected.
  Interest on private loans is legally limited to 12%, but there is no means
  of enforcing the law.  I was told of money lenders, both in local villages and in
the more suburban villages, and know of two specific cases where the interest
was 6% and 8% per month respectively.  One man had thus, for 100 T.L.
which he had borrowed in 1949, to pay back at the following harvest nearly
200 T.L.  the extent of usury of this type would be very difficult to estimate,
but only under serious duress would a villager have recourse to so uncommon
a source of credit, and very few definite examples came to my notice.
  By contras, a network of personal debt to neighbours and kinsmen
  stretches from house to house and from village to village.  Here again details
were not easy to discover nor reliable when unearthed.  Such debts don not
normally carry and interest at all.  All real activities in the village were liable
to be run on credit, since to refuse a credit for some small need to a fellow
villager would be to risk causing deep offence.  The shop which was opened
during the winter by a son-in-law of  BA ran on credit, ant he shopkeeper
returned at regular intervals during the summer in hopes of collecting some of
his debts before the harvest.  He had little success.  The carpenters (SI) were
making threshing boards on credit for people in neighbouring villages as well
as in Sakaltutan and the brothers Mehmet and Ibrahim (SI 2 and 3) claimed to
have 2,000 T.L. owing to them. Again Hasan, after his divorce, found a wife in
another village, but needed 200 T.L. for the bride price quickly, lest another
take her.  So he raised a number of small loans from neighbours in the village.
More than once men came to me for small loans, saying that a creditor who
need money to meet his own creditors was pressing for payment.  If the year is
normal, these debts are paid off after the harvest.
  Totals of indebtedness I know only exactly in three cases.  

  XIII.2                                                  209

  Of these three households, two had debts totalling 280 and 250 T.L.
respectively.  One of them was a poor man, and again this year his harvest
yielded insufficient grain for food and seed for the year’s needs, so that, far



 



  from paying back, he needed to raise more credit.  The third was a man with
over 100 donum.  He owed 500 T.L. for various purposes, and besides this,
1,600 T.L. to his father’s brother’s daughter, who had married to a village five
hours away, nearer Kayseri, for land which he bought from her.  I asked him
why, if he was so in debt, he had betrothed his third won, still quite a young
lad, thus involving himself in further expenditure that was not immediately
necessary.  ¸¸Relatives“, he said, ¸¸can wait“.  Two other men said they owed
about 1,000 T.L. , one in answer to a direct question by me, the other
spontaneously and in public.  This figure (£250) was obviously meant to sound
impressively high, in fact, a boast.  I also know that several poorer families
had only insignificant debts.
  Indebtedness is correlated not with poverty but with wealth.  Poor
  households are not in debt because they have no security on which to raise
money;  no one will lend to a poor man.  If a poor man, for example, wants a
wife, he does not borrow 100 T.L. or less.  If he needs money he must go
away to the town and earn it.  When the muhtar boasted of his 1,000 T.L. debt,
he was in fact advertising his wealth, because, without extensive lands and
animals, he could neither obtain nor face such a loan.  In fact, one might say
that one of the advantages of wealth in land an animals is that it gives security
for loans, thus providing a margin against scarcity of special needs.  Haci
Ahmet was, at the end of my stay, in association with capital from outside the
village, building a mill to be run by a diesel engine, and for this purpose he
had mortgaged his own property.  He hold me he had over 1,5000 T.L. of
debt, though I have my doubts about the calculations by which he reached this
figure.  Any peasant with a fair amount of land can make use of credit;  the
more animals a man can afford to keep, even if only to fatten them a little and


  XIII.2                                                  210

  sell later at a better price, the better.  The longer once can postpone selling a
lamb to pay a debt, the fatter the lamb and the higher the selling price.  Hence
debt is not particularly disgraceful, nor, unless there is mounting interest, or
compulsion from the Agricultural Bank, is a man in any hurry to pay up.
Only Zubeyr (SI 4), the resident carpenter, who had often to wait for his
clients to pay for quite long periods, expressed the idea that debt was
disgraceful and claimed that he himself always paid promptly.
  In peasant societies all over the world, endemic indebtedness has lead to
  expropriation of the peasant owner, who becomes the tenant of the money
lender, and is , thereafter, at his mercy, and is allowed to keep only as much as
will keep him alive to work the land.  In the plateau villages of Anatolia, the
conditions of peasant ownership which I found in Sakaltutan are typical;
absentee landlords are rare and found only close to the towns, often so close



Next Page    -

Return to Stirling Archives